This paper examined empirically the overall effect of the project aid fragmentation in the health and education sectors. It focused on the infant and child mortality rate for the health sector and the primary school completion rate for the education sector because they are flagged as important indicators of the MDGs. The research questions in this paper are whether the mitigation of project aid fragmentation leads to the improvement of the two indicators and whether the result differs between health and education. The major findings are the followings: Even if project aid fragmentation is reduced, there may be no reduction in infant and child mortality rates. On the contrary, The rate will be the worst at the mid-range of fragmentation. On the other hand, the reduction of aid fragmentation in countries which receive relatively high external aid will positively impact the primary school completion rate. These findings lead to the conclusion that the effectiveness of aid-fragmentation reduction differs from one sector to another and depends on the degree of aid dependence.
Introduction
Aid fragmentation, which allegedly raises transaction costs by imposing administrative burdens on recipient countries and harming their governance, has been regarded as one of the central issues to be overcome by the international aid community. In 2005, the necessity to tackle the aid fragmentation problem was unanimously agreed upon in the "Paris Aid Effectiveness Declaration." Six years later, at the Busan High Level Forum, aid fragmentation was still a central problem to be redressed.
However, most of prior studies discuss the burden of transaction costs as if they were uniform across the whole government. The aid fragmentation at the sector level has only recently been brought to light, and the effect of aid fragmentation on sector-level outcomes has not yet been sufficiently clarified. This paper attempts to examine such effects in two social sectors: health and education.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: The next section will review literatures and present the research question. Section 2 will identify variables and data, and Section 3 will analyze the data and show the results. The final section will summarize the paper.
The major findings of this analysis show that the relationship between aid fragmentation and the infant and child mortality rate takes the form of an inverted U curve. This means that, even if aid fragmentation is reduced, there may be no reduction in infant and child mortality rates. On the contrary, reducing such fragmentation by half could make a situation worse. On the other hand, the reduction of aid fragmentation in countries which receive relatively high external aid will positively impact the primary school completion rate. These findings lead to the conclusion that the effectiveness of aid-fragmentation reduction differs from one sector to another and depends on the degree of aid dependence.
Literature review and research question
The phenomenon of aid fragmentation is described in the statement by the OECD Chairman and the DAC Chairman at the 2005 High-Level Forum (HLF) in Paris.
According to this statement, there are more than 60,000 aid projects in recipient countries, and the donor-led approach in those projects reduces the impact of development aid, not only by imposing different implementation processes determined by each donor, but also by obstructing efforts on the parts of recipient countries to build their own implementation systems.
Much of the existing literature argues that aid fragmentation is in fact happening rapidly, and that this fragmentation imposes a heavy burden and strain on the recipient governments (Cassen 1994, 175; Frot and Santiso 2010; Kharas 2007 etc.) . This phenomenon has been termed "recipient fragmentation" (Acharya et al. 2006, 8; Kihara 2012) , "project proliferation" (Morss 1984, 465; Cassen 1994, 175; Kimura et al. 2007 Kimura et al. , 2012 ; Knack and Rahman 2008 1 ), "fragmentation of aid delivery" (Steinwand 2013) , "fragmentation of aid" (Kharas 2007, 5) , and "proliferation of aid project" (Roodman 2006a ).
On the other hand, aid fragmentation is sometimes defined as the proliferation of aid by a donor in a given partner country. This phenomenon is called "donor fragmentation" (Bürcky 2011) or "donor proliferation" (Acharya et al. 2006; Kihara 2012) . The aid fragmentation examined in this paper is not "donor proliferation," but the one described by the OECD Chairman in 2005. To avoid confusion, this paper will use the term "project aid fragmentation" or simply "aid fragmentation" to indicate the latter.
Numerous attempts have been made to address the issue of aid fragmentation. O'Connell and Soludo (2001) find that the transaction cost of aid in Africa was comparatively high as compared with other regions. Acharya et al. (2006) estimate the degree of donor proliferation and the degree of project aid fragmentation in each recipient country and show that the worst proliferators are likely to be suppliers of aid to the recipients which suffer most from aid fragmentation. Knack and Rahman (2007) regress the 2001 Bureaucratic Quality ratings of the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) to explanatory variables such as the project aid fragmentation, the ODA/GDP ratio, population growth, per capita GDP growth, and the share of aid from international organizations and "like-minded" groups to demonstrate that project aid fragmentation has a negative and significant influence on bureaucratic quality. However, Kihara (2012) points out that Knack and Rahman's study (2007) is just a "point" estimate for the 2001 rating. To assess the long-term effect of aid fragmentation, Kihara (2012) uses the Government Effectiveness Index in "Aggregate Governance Indicators" (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2008) which offers panel data for 85 countries. His explanatory variables include the index of project aid fragmentation (the inverse of Herfindahl-Hirschman index), the index of donor proliferation (Theil Index for total ODA), ODA/GNI ratio, GNI per capita, GDP growth rate, population size, multilateral and bilateral aid, and a dummy variable indicating civil wars. His estimates show that project aid fragmentation has a negative impact on bureaucratic quality.
There is also work that attempts to examine socio-economic impact of the aid fragmentation. Kimura et al. (2007 Kimura et al. ( , 2012 and Djankov et al. (2009) try to verify the impact of aid on economic growth in recipient countries which suffer project aid fragmentation. Kimura et al. (2007 Kimura et al. ( , 2012 use it, together with interaction terms between HHI and the amount of aid, to estimate the impact on the growth rate. The result suggests that the project aid fragmentation has a negative impact on economic growth in recipient countries. Djankov et al. (2009) also measure the HHI on the basis of the DAC CRS data for 1960-99 and find a similar result.
Although a great deal of effort has been made to examine the impact of project aid fragmentation on government effectiveness and economic growth, little is known about its impact on sectoral performance. Prior empirical studies discuss the burden of transaction costs as if they were uniform across the whole government sectors, when actually they may differ from one sector to another. Since there has been a strong tendency for donors to focus on social sectors, especially health and education, since the adoption of MDGs, the level of the transaction cost is expectedly higher in these sectors (Frot and Santiso 2010; Bürcky 2011) . This paper will therefore look into the impact of aid fragmentation in the health and education sectors. It will focus for the health sector on the infant and child mortality rate and for the education sector on the primary school completion rate widens, which indicates that aid is more concentrated (less fragmented) in the hands of a smaller number of donors (Kimura et al. 2007) . For example, when five donors implement 10 projects each in a developing country, HHI will be 0.2. If three of them reduce the number of projects from 10 to 5, the fourth donor increases it from 10 to 15 and if the fifth donor increases the number from 10 to 20, the total numbers of projects are still 50 but HHI will be 0.28. The burden for the recipient government is expectedly smaller in this case because it can use its administrative resources to coordinate with a smaller number of big donors. 
Other variables
Before discussing independent variables besides HHI, it is necessary to check if any linearity is observed between HHI and the dependent variables: the infant and child mortality rate and the primary school completion rate. Figure 1 demonstrates that the infant and child mortality rate moves on a gentle U curve as HHI goes up (indicating a decline in aid fragmentation). For the primary school completion rate, the curve is a gently inverted U curve. These results indicate the possibility that a higher HHI (a lower fragmentation) does not necessarily improve sectoral performance. The reduction of aid fragmentation may exert a negative influence differently in different sectors.
Since the diagrams below suggest that there is non-linear relationship between the project aid fragmentation and both the infant/child mortality rate and the primary school completion rate, the author includes not only HHI but also squared HHI (HHI   2   ) for the polynomial model.
3
In addition, the interaction terms have been set between the sum total of all aid by all donors on the one hand and HHI and HHI (2011) show that voice and accountability (i.e., the extent to which citizens of a country can participate in choosing their own government, and attitudes toward freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media) have a positive impact on health indicators. 5 Quantitative data for all these public-sector indicators are adopted from The Worldwide Governance Indicators 2012, Aggregate Indicators of Governance 1996-2011 (http://www.govindicators.org). The same independent and instrument variables are used for our analysis of primary school completion rates. The only exclusion is the amount of government expenditure on education as a percentage of GDP. This omission is due to many missing values. However, the estimation method will be designed to correct the bias.
Data
In this paper, HHI will be calculated on the basis of the number of projects which have been carried out in the recipient countries. Many of the prior works use the committed amount of project aid available at the DAC CRS (Clemens, Radelet, and Bhavnani 2004; Acharya et al. 2006; Knack and Rahman 2007; Fielding and Mavrotas 2008; Neanidis and Varvarigos 2009; Aldasoro et al. 2009; Dkankov et al. 2009; Frot and Santiso 2010; Bürcky 2011; Kihara 2012; etc.) In this paper, the disbursed amount of aid and the number of actual projects will be used for the analysis. This means that the data the author use will be limited to information from 2002 and later. This is because the DAC Secretariat recommends that CRS data should not be used for a serious analysis if the coverage ratio is not high enough. http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/usersguidetothecreditorreportingsystemcrsaidactivitiesdatabase.htm. Hudson (2012,1) believes that on a panel data basis, it is possible to conduct a meaningful analysis using data from 2002 onwards.
8 By comparing data sets, we have been able to confirm the approximation between our data set and the OECD DAC (2010) data set. To count the number of projects, we used the same method that Frot and Santiso (2008) did. The DAC CRS database assign an identification number to each aid project. Two different projects from the same donor have different ID numbers. So, it is easy to count the number of projects for each donor. There are some data deficiencies, though. Some projects reportedly transferred zero or negative financial resources and therefore need to be removed from our dataset. In addition, it must be noted that there are cases where an individual project is implemented in several locations and requires coordination among the sub-projects. The real To calculate HHI, the principal independent variable of this paper, the author uses the number of projects classified as 400 or lower codes for 2002 in the DAC CRS database. He uses the aid amount of these projects to calculate the total amount of a donor's assistance, the donor's health aid, and education aid in a recipient country. The data from the World Development Indicator (WDI) are used for GDP growth rate per capita, the infant and child mortality rate, the primary school completion rate, population, investment, a measure of financial depth (M2/GDP), and the amount of government expenditure for health. The governance indicators are from Aggregate Governance Indicators in Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2010) . However, since it was not possible to obtain the data for every year for every country, the author has carried out an unbalanced panel analysis. Table 2 lists the descriptive statistics used in the present analysis.
transaction cost may be underestimated by counting the number of projects. The analysis is limited by these data inadequacies. In designing a regression analysis of aid effectiveness, many of the existing studies discuss the need to consider the problem of endogeneity. The dynamic panel GMM (Generalized Method of Moments) recommended by Hansen and Tarp (2001) include the techniques of the Difference GMM and the System GMM. First, to correct the possibility of correlation between the independent variable and the disturbance term caused by missing variables, the author considered introducing the Arellano-Bond (1991) GMM is used to correct for bias stemming from fixed effects by taking first differences.
It also corrects for endogeneity by using the lag between predetermined variables and endogenous variables as the instrumental variable. However, as Arellano and Bover (1995) warn, when the coefficient for a lagged dependent variable is close to one, the probability of proximity to random walk is high, and in that case, the lagged level is a weak instrumental variable for first differences. Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) developed the System GMM estimation to mitigate this problem.
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The System GMM conducts an analysis by levels before taking the differences into account. This paper uses the System GMM uniformly since the coefficient for the lagged dependent variable for the infant and child mortality rate and the primary school completion rate is higher than 0.8 according to our estimation. The author postulates the following equation for the System GMM. En it indicates the matrix of predetermined variables and endogenous variables.
For the infant and child mortality rate, these variables cover government health expenditure as a percentage of GDP, GDP growth rate per capita (logarithm), voice and accountability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, investment, and M2.
For the primary school completion rate, they cover the same as for the infant and child mortality rate except for government education expenditure as a percentage of GDP, which is excluded because many values are missing. Ex it indicates the exogenous variables such as a time dummy and the population growth rate. The author also uses the "Nordic Plus focus" dummy as the instrumental variable. Finally, α i 、α t 、and ε it are country-specific fixed effects, year-specific effects, and a well-behaved error term, respectively.
For each of the abovementioned System GMM estimations, the author uses the Hansen's J test to examine whether the instrumental variable fulfills the disturbance term and orthogonal conditions, while he uses the Arellano-Bond test to check autocorrelation in the disturbance term.
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The author also employs a one-step estimation with robust standard error.
Estimation results
First, the author looks at the relationship between project aid fragmentation and the infant and child mortality rate. The infant and child mortality rate, indicating the probability of a child dying between birth and five years of age, is expressed in a mortality rate per 1000 live births. Therefore, we need to bear in mind that the increase of the numerical value indicates the worsening of infant and child mortality. Table 3 summarizes the results of the System GMM estimation on the rate. 11 It is possible to estimate Difference GMM with the xtabond2 Stata command created by David Roodman.
As can be seen in Table 3 , the infant and child mortality rate is positively and significantly correlated with the health project concentration index (HHI). Similarly, it is significantly correlated with HHI 2 but the direction of correlations is negative. This indicates that the effect of "project aid fragmentation" on the infant and child mortality rate is an inverted-U relationship. When the health project concentration index (HHI) is The rate will be the worst at the mid-range of fragmentation.
Both the "amount of health aid as % of GDP" and the "Government health expenditure as % of GDP" have negative coefficients with the aid fragmentation, which means that the scale of health aid and government health expenditure can contribute to reducing the infant and child mortality rate. However, the correlation is As for the other control variables, only the "population growth" in the model (6) shows statistically significant and negative correlations with the infant and child mortality rate. The variables for economics and governance are not statistically significant.
The results of our estimation are generally robust and do not change even when different models are applied. Furthermore, for all the models used, both the Arellano-Bond test that checks auto-correlations in the disturbance term and the Hansen's J test that checks whether the instrumental variable fulfills the disturbance term and orthogonal conditions show reasonable values, which indicates that the models are suitable. In addition, as the last column of Table 3 indicates, the number of instruments does not exceed the number of countries in the regression. All the cases in Figure 3 demonstrate inverted U curves, suggesting that the 12 Roodman (2007b) points out that the number of instruments should not exceed the number of countries in the regression. Change in the child mortality rate Table 4 , where the results look most statistically significant.
As shown in this figure, when the amount of aid as percentage of GDP is relatively low (0.055% in the first quartile and 0.282% in the second quartile), the rate of primary school completion declines as HHI increases from 0 to 0.45 or 0.5 with the lowest point reached at 0.2 or 0.3. It starts to improve after HHI reaches 0.45 or 0.5.
When the amount of aid as percentage of GDP is relatively high as in the third quartile (with 0.894%) and in Sub-Sahara Africa (with 1.01%), the primary school completion rate goes up constantly as the aid concentration increases. East Asia (with 0.69%) is somewhere in between these two cases. The completion rate starts to improve only after the HHI reaches 0.2 there. 
Conclusion
This paper has empirically examined the overall effect of project aid fragmentation on the infant and child mortality rate and the primary school completion rate. Project aid fragmentation is a situation in which a large number of fragmented and non-coordinated donor projects are introduced in a recipient country raising the transaction costs of the recipient government. To measure project aid fragmentation, this paper used the DAC CRS disbursement data on the projects directly integrated into Since there is non-linear relationship between project aid fragmentation and the infant and child mortality rate or the primary school completion rate, the author included not only HHI but also squared HHI (HHI 2 ) as the polynomial model. The author estimated the impact of each variable, controlling for the influence of other variables, and found that the result differs from one sector to another. The relationship between the project aid fragmentation and the infant and child mortality rate shows an inverted U curve suggesting that the infant and child mortality rate worsens as HHI increases up to a certain point. Furthermore, even if the project aid fragmentation declines beyond such a point, the effect is no greater than lowering the rate at which the mortality rate worsens. The infant and child mortality rate improves only in the case where the recipient country is heavily dependent on health aid and the HHI is exceptionally high.
The reduction of project aid fragmentation has a better chance to contribute to improving the primary school completion rate. Especially in the countries whose dependence on aid is relatively high in education, consistently positive impacts from the concentration of project aid can be expected.
It is clear that the effect of aid concentration (the reduction of aid fragmentation) varies among different sectors and depends on the level of dependence on aid of each recipient country in each sector. In the future discussion of aid effectiveness, sectoral variations should be seriously taken into account. 
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